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African trade statistics suffer from errors of commission and omission. A quarter-century ago, Alexander Yeats (1990) compared receipts of
importers and exporters and concluded that the data could not be used to determine the magnitude, direction, or composition of trade. The only fact
to be safely deduced from the evidence was that the statistics were plagued by widespread smuggling and/or underreporting. More than two
decades later, despite improvement in external economic conditions, trade statistics continue to be lacking in quality.
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Formal statistics depend on correct reporting. In his classic
text on the accuracy of economic statistics Morgenstern (1963)
warned about the problem of misreporting. With regards to
balance of trade and payments, he cautioned that a measure of
“the balance of trade is an arbitrary and fearfully vague notion.
The correct way of speaking, though more cumbersome, would
be to say that there is an excess of statistically reported ‘visible’
trade in one or the other direction” (ibid: 137, italics copied
from original text). He further cautioned that
Anyone who sat through meetings (as the author has) in
which final balance of payments figures for most invisible
items were put together, can only marvel at the naiveté withURL: http://www.mortenjerven.com.
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ll rigwhich these products of fantasy, policy, and imagination,
combined with figures diligently arrived at, are gravely used
in subsequent publications (ibid., p. 180).
Of particular interest is that Morgenstern was writing on
developed economies at the time. Perhaps less surprising is that
the state of affairs is no better for African economies. This
article re-poses the important question: Do Sub-Saharan trade
statistics mean anything?
The question was the starting point for an article written in
1990 by Alexander Yeats. At that time he was an economist in
the International Economics Department of the World Bank.
By comparing the receipts of importers and exporters, he
concluded that African trade statistics could not be relied upon
to indicate trends, nor the magnitude, composition, or direction
of trade within the continent. Yeats' only conclusion from the
existing evidence was one of widespread smuggling and/or
underreporting within the African continent.
In this research note I revisit the quality of the African trade
statistics to determine what the current state of affairs is. The
article begins by reviewing the findings of Yeats from 1990. It
moves on to investigate the available metadata on African Trade
andBalance of Payment statistics since Yeats published his article.hts reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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Errors of omission and of commission
It is a well-known truism that economic growth in Africa is
strongly and positively influenced by cross-border trade (Jerven,
2010). Since the mid-1990s, official statistics has shown a rise
in GDP in most African economies. The change in the
aggregate growth data is driven primarily by growth in the
visible external sector (Jerven, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). Accord-
ingly, the reliability and validity of the external sector data
have important implications for the interpretation of Africa's
recent growth.
The actual relationship between trade and growth in these
economies is not well reflected in the official statistics, because of
well-known biases in recording and data availability. The result is
that the impact of trade on growth is likely to be overemphasized
in the compilation GDP statistics (Jerven, 2014). This owes to
the greater attention that is paid to collecting (and thus, the
greater availability of) external trade statistics – relative to
statistics on domestic trade, or agricultural production for
example. The result is that the direct relationship between trade
and growth is being biased upwards. The overall paucity of
data dictates that most visible change will come from the sector
that has the highest level of data availability – the external
sector. With this in mind, the accuracy of trade statistics is of
the utmost importance to the measurement of economic growth
in Africa.
The usefulness of statistics depends on their availability,
precision, and accuracy. Indeed, little can be done if data is not
available, if it suffers from a lack of specificity, or if it fails to
accurately reflect what is really happening. In his investigation
into the available data on African trade statistics, Yeats (1990)
found the data to be lacking in all three dimensions.
After completing his investigation into the reliability of African
data coming from the United Nations Statistical Office, Yeats
summarized the stock of available statistics to be problematic. For
developed countries there were continuous time series available –
subject to a one year lag. In 1989, the same information for
African economies generally extended only until 1983, after
which the data was simply unavailable. By comparison the typical
lag in Latin America was generally in the two to three year
range while the industrializing economies of East Asia were as
up-to-date as the developed world. While a half dozen African
countries offered statistics past 1983 (extending no further than
1986), the statistics were further undermined by a substantial
number of holes in the time-series as well as by three of the
thirty-nine cases having no data available whatsoever.1 Putting
this together, policy-makers and analysts in 1989 were
typically informed by six year old data; were lucky to have a
lag of only three years; and had sporadic or no data in some
cases.1 These three were Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland – all members of the
South African Customs Union.One measure of a statistical office's precision in compiling
trade statistics is its adherence to the Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC). The SITC is the United Nations' five-level
system for classifying traded goods. According to the SITC, the
higher the level of classification the more specific it is. Thus, at the
broadest level of abstraction (the first level) one would come
across Section 0 – the code for “food and live animals”. This can
be narrowed down to the fourth level where one can differentiate
between, for example, bovine animals (001.1) and swine (001.3).
Evenmore specific is the fifth level where one comes across codes
such as 001.11 – “pure-bred breeding animals” and 001.19 –
“other than pure-bred breeding animals”.
Yeats' investigation into the level of detail in African trade
statistics found nearly full coverage to the three-digit level but
that less than a third of the countries for which statistics existed
had full coverage at the four-digit SITC level. Thus, for the vast
majority of African cases in 1989, one was able to determine that
live animals were crossing the border but not what kind of
animals they were. This lack of precision was argued to be
problematic for studies at the product-specific level (for example,
in the context of debating trade barriers on specific commodities).
Even if the relevant data was available and at the appropriate
level of precision, policy-makers and analysts were still
confronted with the third (and perhaps most serious) statistical
dilemma – that the information was simply incorrect (errors of
omission and commission). To investigate this point, Yeats
started with the basic premise that balance of payment statistics
should, at least in theory, balance out. Simply put, the exports
from Country A to Country B should match the imports of
Country B from Country A.
Unfortunately, this does not work out so perfectly in practice–
for poor or for developed countries. Yeats found that African
trade statistics suffered from such inconsistency as to render them
useless for the purpose of informing policy. Typical of this was
the fact that trade between Sub-Saharan Africa and the United
States suffered from, on average, a 39% difference between
reported imports from the United States and actual recorded
exports to sub-Saharan Africa.2 Data on intra-African trade was
even more problematic and, when matching each country to its
largest continental trading partner, suffered from an average
discrepancy of 64% excluding the Gambia and 109% including it
(Yeats, 1990, p. 146). These inaccuracies were attributed to both
systematic and systemic causes.
The first group of causes stemmed from the various
accounting inconsistencies of importers and exporters. Some of
these inconsistencies were as innocuous as exporters reporting
“free on board” (f.o.b.) values – only the value of goods – while
importers reported “cost, insurance, and freight” (c.i.f.). Thus, if
everything else was accurate, imports would have exceeded
exports by the value of insurance and freight. Of course, many
other systematic challenges (such as rounding; the way that goods2 Calculated as (Imports–Exports)/Exports * 100, where the United States
was the importing country.
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was reflected; and the influence of multiple exchange rates)
inhibited attempts to equate imports with exports.
More problematic still was the role that micro-level incentives
played in distorting macro-level statistics. Yeats cited Bhagwati's
finding that the presence of subsidies can encourage exporters to
“over-invoice” shipments while tariffs have the opposite effect on
the reporting of imports. Additionally, an overvalued domestic
currency would have the opposite effect in that exporters would
have an incentive to under-report their shipments while importers
would want to over-report – both for the purpose of accumulating
foreign currency for its sale on the black market (ibid., p. 136).
Furthermore, the existence of trade restrictions (such as
export quotas on oil), political factors (embargoes), and the
prevalence of smuggling all had the potential to distort official
trade statistics in one way or another. Such a problem could be
exacerbated when the incentives of exporters and importers
align so as to create mutual benefits from an offsetting
distortion of the statistics on either side. This would effectively
hide all traces of such distorting practices.
Putting this all together, Yeats found that the data that
existed with regards to African trade statistics suffered from an
overall lack of availability, precision, and accuracy. These
issues led to the conclusion that the data were inadequate for
the purpose of determining the magnitude and patterns of the
direction and composition of trade in Africa. Accordingly,
Yeats argued that it was impossible to place any level of
confidence in the data that existed and that there was a serious
risk of research being biased and policy misinformed (p. 153).
This was the state of affairs in the 1980s and 1990s. This paper
next investigates if circumstances have changed since then.
It should come as no surprise that some things have changed
since the 1990s. For example, the typical African economy of the
1990s was either in stagnation or decline. Making matters worse,
such economies tended to suffer from large current account
deficits and trade volumes that were suspected to have been in a
prolonged decline – since the 1970s in some cases. This period of
economic decline was combined with a general discontinuity in
many functions of the state (Van deWalle, 2001). These included
responsibilities such as statistical reporting, both from adminis-
trative units in the government ministries as well as the statistical
offices themselves. These problems stemmed from dearth in
funding; staffing; and incentives to provide timely and accurate
data on the inflows and outflows of goods, services and payments
across national borders. These problems persist today (Jerven,
2013a, 2013b, 2013c).
While Yeats found that these conditions were conducive to the
smuggling of goods and the misreporting of information, it is
likely that incentives will have changed since then. So while the
1970s and early 1980s were characterized by state interventions
designed to control and tax cross-border trade, the next two
decades were characterized by efforts to liberalize those same
interventions. In the 1970s many marketing boards for export
crops (such as cocoa and coffee) fixed commodity prices well
below world market prices and created incentives for producers
and traders to circumvent official channels. Furthermore,
subsidized prices for domestically consumed goods such aspetroleum created arbitrage opportunities. In this context, profits
could be made by smuggling and/or re-exporting such goods to
markets where their prices were higher. Finally, controlled access
to foreign exchange and the overvaluation of domestic currencies
created potentially high rewards for those who could access
foreign exchange through dubious means (Azam, 2007).
Overall, these transactions could be characterized as being
prone to errors of commission where trade was purposefully
withheld from the official records. Surprisingly, while the
ensuing liberalization of trading regimes decreased the potential
rents associated with errors of commission, the liberalization
has not been necessarily accompanied by more accurate
statistics. Rather, where errors of commission once existed,
errors of omission have been quick to fill the void.
Most statistics, including those related to trade, are collected
because the state has an interest in doing so. Exemplifying this
problem is the observation that if a state (versus an independent
contractor) does not collect customs, then there are usually no
records of their collection. To this point, Hibou cites the
examples of Mozambique and Cameroon and notes that the
collection of customs has been privatized and that correspond-
ingly “the national accounts do not record either the volume or
the value of the exports, nor the tax and customs revenue”
(2004, p. 7).
This problem is especially pronounced in the context of
intra-African trade. Highlighting this is Cooper's (2002)
description of African states as ‘gatekeeper states’. He describes
the gatekeeper states as states that employ their revenues and
authority for the purpose of controlling “the interface of national
and world economies” (ibid., p. 141). Furthermore, that
historically there have been higher returns to controlling trade
between Kampala and London than between Kampala and Juba
or Kampala and Kigali means that it continues to be paid far less
attention to intra-African trade.
3. Do Sub-Saharan trade statistics mean anything today?
The preceding section will undoubtedly lead one to wonder
how far we have come in the last quarter century. This section
responds to these questions as it investigates the quality of data on
balance of payment statistics. Rather than comparing the receipts
of trading partners, this paper makes use of the metadata reported
on trade statistics by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank.
The IMF reports on the prevalence of the use of the Balance
of Payments Manual (BPM) in Sub-Saharan Africa while also
publishing reports on statistical practices in countries. The
BPM, currently in its sixth edition, embodies the IMF's interest
in “developing and promulgating guidelines for the compilation
of consistent, sound, and timely balance of payments statistics”
(International Monetary Fund, 2006, p. ix). It serves as a guide
in the compilation of national balance of payments statistics
with four principal objectives in mind. These are:
i. To provide and explain concepts, definitions, classifica-
tions, and conventions for balance of payments and
international investment position statistics
Table 1
Prevalence of the Balance of Payments Manual (version 5 or 6) in Sub-Saharan Africa.
2004 2005 2006 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Countries covered 42 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 48
Countries using BPM 33 35 35 35 36 37 37 38 41 43
% 78.6 74.5 74.5 74.5 76.6 78.7 78.7 80.9 87.2 89.6
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the promotion of guidelines adopted internationally
iii. To show the links of balance of payments and international
investment position statistics to other macroeconomic
statistics and promote consistency between different data
sets
iv. To provide a brief introduction to uses of data on balance
of payments, other changes in financial assets and
liabilities, and international investment position, as the
international accounts of an economy
It is a testament to the efforts of the IMF and its member
countries that the BPM has been adopted by an overwhelming
majority of developing countries. According to the World
Bank's Development Data Group (DECDG, 2013), the BPM is
in use in 141 out of 149 developing countries. This equates to
94.6% of the population and is up from 88% nine years ago.
With this said, five of the eight countries that have yet to adopt
the BPM are from Sub-Saharan Africa (with the remaining
three coming from East-Asia and the Pacific).3 The region's
adherence to the BPM is highlighted in Table 1.
Obviously, a country's adherence to the BPM is only one
aspect of the overall quality of its balance of payments
statistics. Alternatively, the IMF – at the request of any
member country – will publish a Report on the Observance of
Standards and Codes (ROSC) for the requesting country. Data
dissemination is one of the twelve areas in which ROSC are
produced and balance of payments is one of the six fields
traditionally covered by an ROSC on data dissemination.
ROSCs on data dissemination rely on the IMF's Data Quality
Assessment Framework (DQAF). The DQAF assesses six fields–
a set of prerequisites and five dimensions of data quality. Each
dimension is composed of three to five elements each with their
own set of relevant indicators (see Appendix 1). Based on a
country's adherence to these indicators, one of four scores is given
for each element. The possible scores are “practice observed” (O);
“practice largely observed” (LO); “practice largely not observed”
(LNO); and “practice not observed” (NO).
Sixteen such reports are available for countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The remainder of this section summarizes the findings of
these reports with the intention of gaining greater insight into the
current state of statistical practices in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Regrettably, the aforementioned problem of data availability
also plagues metadata on trade statistics. The sixteen reports
represent only a third of Sub-Saharan African countries.4 Further,3 Thus, while only 3 of 101 (b3%) countries outside of SSA do not adhere to
the BPM, that number is 5 out of 48 (10.4%) within SSA.
4 This number is reduced to ﬁfteen as the format of Cameroon's 2001 report
made it incompatible with the rest of the collection and thus necessitated its
removal from this stage of analysis.most of the ROSCs for Sub-Saharan Africa are at least ten years
old at the time of writing with none being less than eight years
removed from publication. Accordingly, there is no way of
knowing if circumstances have improved, remained static, or
regressed in the years that have followed each ROSC's
publication.
Additionally, that an ROSC is produced at the request of a
member country makes it likely that some form of self-selection
bias exists. One might assume that countries that are more
attentive to following agreed upon statistical practices would be
more likely to request an ROSC. Accordingly, the findings that
follow might be assumed to constitute an upper bound for the
quality of balance of payment statistics or, at the very least, be
understood to be positively biased in the sense that they
overstate the quality of trade statistics in Sub-Saharan Africa.
For the purpose of quantitative comparison, I code ROSC
scores on a zero (NO) to one (O) scale. Intermediate scores are
placed at equal points between these two poles. Thus, a score of
LNO is coded as one-third and a score of LO two-thirds. Scores
for each of the six DQAF fields are calculated by summing up
the scores for their respective elements and then dividing them
by the number of elements that are assessed. In the event that
more than one report was produced for a specific country, the
scores for each DQAF field are then averaged out.5 While this is
not a very sophisticated way of quantifying metrics on statistical
capacity it should be understood as useful for its purpose.6 This
purpose is in highlighting that significant departures from best
practices exist in the calculation of balance of payment statistics
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results of these calculations are
reflected in Table 2.
A cursory overview of these figures suggests that scores
generally fall in the largely observed category – meaning that
the best practices set out by the IMF fall short of being followed
within the offices that produce balance of payment statistics. Of
course, variation exists across the fifteen cases with the Gambia
receiving the lowest average score (0.472) while no country
exceeded the 0.884 that Senegal achieved. If the aforemen-
tioned assumption that these scores represent an upper bound
for the region, then the data suggests that countries within
Sub-Saharan Africa are less than diligent with regards to their
collection of balance of payment statistics.
Compared to Africa, the rest of the world was far more
successful in adhering to DQAF standards. In total, sixty-two
other countries representing five other continents and every
World Bank income category were evaluated by the IMF.5 Countries with multiple reports were: Chile, Costa Rica, Georgia, Italy,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mauritius, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey.
6 And the method is surely not much less advanced than the one used to
measure Statistical Capacity by the World Bank.
Table 2
Average scores for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, by ROSC field.
Year Prerequisites
of quality
Assurances
of integrity
Methodological
soundness
Accuracy and
reliability
Serviceability Accessibility Average ⁎
Botswana 2003 0.750 0.889 0.917 0.667 0.667 0.778 0.778
Burkina Faso 2003 0.667 0.889 1.000 0.867 0.750 0.667 0.806
Chad 2003 0.583 0.889 0.917 0.867 0.444 0.556 0.709
Gambia, The 2003 0.417 0.778 0.417 0.333 0.556 0.333 0.472
Kenya 2003 0.583 0.778 0.833 0.600 0.778 0.556 0.688
Malawi 2003 0.556 0.778 0.583 0.533 0.583 0.556 0.598
Mauritius 2002/2008 0.778 0.833 0.625 0.533 0.528 0.667 0.661
Mozambique 2002 0.667 0.889 0.667 0.533 0.583 0.556 0.649
Namibia 2002 0.778 0.889 0.917 0.467 0.750 0.556 0.726
Niger 2003 0.750 0.889 0.917 0.733 0.667 0.556 0.752
Senegal 2002 1.000 0.889 1.000 1.000 0.750 0.667 0.884
South Africa 2001 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 1.000 0.889 0.870
Tanzania 2004 0.778 0.889 0.667 0.533 0.667 0.667 0.700
Uganda 2006 0.833 1.000 0.667 0.867 0.667 1.000 0.839
Zambia 2005 0.750 0.889 0.583 0.533 0.778 0.556 0.681
Average 0.726 0.878 0.758 0.649 0.678 0.637 0.721
⁎ Averages were calculated first for specific DQAF fields, and then as an overall.
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The average difference (between Sub-Saharan African
scores and those of the rest of the world) of 0.139 falls more
than 1.5 standard deviations away from the latter's mean. In
fact, in all six DQAF fields the African statistics lag behind
those of the rest of the world and nowhere more is this the case
than in “Accuracy and Reliability” – a category that reflects the
adequacy of source data, the soundness of statistical techniques,
and the regularity of assessment. Putting this all together,
Yeats' critique of African trade statistics seems as relevant now
as it was in the 1980s.
4. Errors of omission and informal trade
Adherence to international codes and accuracy in reporting
statistics is an important issue. With this said, significant issues
can also exist in the blind spots of an economy or in the activities
that are simply omitted from its records. This section reviews
some of the literature on informal trade in Sub-Saharan Africa
and concludes that the problem is one of considerable magnitude.
The issue of informality is linked to the strength of formal
institutions and specifically to a state's ability to monitor, tax,Table 3
ROSC scores for non-Sub-Saharan African countries.
Median Mean St. dev. Difference ⁎
Prerequisites of quality 0.910 0.874 0.142 0.148
Assurances of integrity 1.000 0.955 0.059 0.077
Methodological soundness 0.833 0.798 0.123 0.040
Accuracy and reliability 0.867 0.841 0.142 0.192
Serviceability 0.840 0.837 0.101 0.159
Accessibility 0.889 0.855 0.154 0.218
Average 0.889 0.860 0.091 0.139
⁎ Simply the difference between themean scores for Sub-SaharanAfrica countries
and the rest of the world. A positive value indicates that the Sub-Saharan Africa
score was lower.and control trade. Azam highlights that a lack of capacity to
collect tax revenues from production and income leads to
revenues often being generated in the form of tariffs on imports
and exports. This practice was much lamented as leading to an
“anti-export bias” and it can have a distorting effect on prices in
the domestic market (2007, p. 11–13). Such a distortion creates
an opportunity for entrepreneurs to benefit at the expense of
statistical accuracy. Azam finds that “for many goods, the
fraction that is actually declared at the customs [sic] is less than
10% of the actual traded flow” (ibid., p. 19).
Of course – by its very nature – the magnitude of trade that
takes place in illegal, black, parallel or informal markets is
difficult to evaluate. MacGaffey (1987, p. 112) summarizes this
challenge by concluding that informal trade is, by definition,
unrecorded. Accordingly, much of the evidence that exists is
either anecdotal, inferred from outside sources, or based on
surveys. With this said, the evidence that does exist suggests
that the issue warrants further investigation.
One such investigation, published by the World Bank
(2011), analyzed the trade in food staples in the Great Lakes
region of Africa. For the three economies surveyed, informal
trade in food staples was found to be no lower than 20% of
overall trade (formal plus informal). The share of informal trade
in total trade was as high as 80% in the case of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and averaged roughly 42% across the
economies (see Table 4). While these figures varied drastically
from case to case, even on the lower end they suggest that the
formal official statistics are suffering from errors of omission.Table 4
Estimated trade in food staples in the Great Lakes Region of Africa (tonnes).
Congo DR Kenya Rwanda
Formal trade 3276 22,728 8286
Informal trade 16,078 9116 2177
Informal trade % share in total trade 83.07 28.63 20.81
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legitimate (legal) and illegitimate. The aforementioned World
Bank report emphasized that informal trade in food stuffs still
qualifies as legitimate commerce “in the sense that traders go
through official border posts, pay a crossing fee to the
immigration office, and if processed appropriately pay a duty
on imports” (p. 2). Such transactions are informal in that they
are not officially recorded because of the small amount of
goods associated with each transaction (Yoshino et al., 2011).
This type of informal trade can be contrasted against the
problem of illicit goods smuggling within the African
continent.7 Regrettably, while this trade in illicit goods poses
a large problem (economically, socially, and politically) for
Sub-Saharan Africa, such discussions go beyond the scope of
this paper. With this in mind, the remainder of this section
focuses on informal legitimate trade within the region.
On the topic of informal legitimate trade, the World Bank's
report goes on to highlight that at many border crossings “there
is no traceability, audit trail, or even way to verify what was
imported, by whom, and how much was paid.” (p. 13). This
problem exists regardless of whether the importer declared their
goods and how well customs procedures were followed. While
each one of these individual transactions is of a relatively
low-scale, added together they make up a significant portion of
overall trade across the borders of Sub-Saharan Africa. On the
macro-level, this means that official statistics have no way of
capturing the volume and composition of trade that crosses a
border in this manner.
Further distorting the statistics is trade of a large enough
scale so as to be recorded, but in which the trader takes
advantage of relaxed border controls in order to avoid paying
associated duties. Leopold (2009) finds that ambitious traders
might further exacerbate the problem as they find ways to take
advantage of poor recording practices and border controls in
order to avoid paying an import duty. This further distorts the
official records as goods are recorded as leaving one country
but not as entering another. Illustrative of this is Leopold's
description of Magendo trade in Uganda.
The main way this worked was that a fuel tanker (say) would
enter Uganda from Kenya with papers stating the load was
for transshipment to Zaire. Therefore no Ugandan duties
would be levied. The truck is driven through Uganda to
(perhaps) the Aru border post where, for a consideration,
the driver obtains stamps from his weigh-bill from the
Ugandan border post showing the fuel has left Uganda and
from the Zairean customs post to show it has entered Zaire.
The truck may even actually cross the border. Either way, its
untaxed contents are siphoned out and taken back to Arua
for distribution throughout Uganda (p. 473).
Such practices may help to explain Yeats' finding that f.o.b.
statistics often exceeded their corresponding c.i.f. values.7 See Ndumbe and Cole (2005) for an illustrative example of this problem.
Alternatively, Ellis (2009) highlights Guinea-Bissau as a country that has been
inﬁltrated by drug interests.An additional complication emerges under conditions wherein
exporters have an incentive to under-report the volume of their
exports. Yeats provides one circumstance under which such an
incentive might emerge – the presence of export quotas (p. 136–
137). Further, while trading regimes have been liberalized,
incentives to underreport trade statistics are still strong enough to
undermine official accounts.8
A USAID report summarizes the broader implications of all
types of informal trade. In highlighting that this kind of trade is
excluded from national accounts; the report warns about the
threat of inaccurate policy recommendations when they are
based on a country's GDP or balance of payment figures
(Ackello-Ogutu and Echessah, 1998, p. xi). Accordingly, it
seems that Yeats' concerns from a quarter-century ago are not
quite a relic of the past.
Recent research on the illicit flows of capital via mispricing
highlights that the quality of statistics on trade matters. Reuter
(2012) noted that falsification of invoices is a potential vehicle for
the unrecorded capita exports from a country. Cobham et al
(2014) looks at discrepancies in trade statistics, and uses
mismatches in bilateral trade to measure illicit flows of capital.
Thus high quality statistics and better transparence on trade and
capital flows may benefit countries if it can reduce illegal flows.
However, it has also been pointed out that too arduous demands
on traceability of minerals, such as those posed by section 1502
of the Dodd–FrankWall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, may also have negative effects on legitimate traders that are
not able fulfill information requirements (Seay, 2012).5. Concluding remarks
World Economic Outlook 2012 gave cause for optimism
regarding current and future economic growth – particularly for
areas in Africa. Using data from the IMF publication, the
Business Insider identified the twenty countries with the highest
projected compounded annual growth rates from 2013 through
2017, based on the IMF's estimates. Ten out of these twenty were
in Sub-Saharan Africa with two more coming from Northern
Africa.
According to aggregate statistics for Sub-Saharan Africa from
the World Bank, trade (imports plus exports) as a share of the
region's GDP hovered around 50% between the 1950s and the
1990s. Since the 1990s GDP for Sub-Saharan Africa has about
doubled.Meanwhile, the rate of growth in external trade since the
1990s is high – reaching 75% in 2008 and rebounding to roughly
70% today (World Bank, 2014). Though these statistics are
rough, they indicate that the region is becoming increasingly
dependent on trade for its sustained economic growth. Accord-
ingly, it will become increasingly important to identify the origin,
destination, level, direction, and composition of this trade. The
existing statistics are not readily supplying this information.
The inaccuracy of trade statistics is a problem for scholars
investigating both long and short term fluctuations in trade
patterns. This paucity of raw data availability and reliability8 See Samuel (2014) for the contemporary case of Mauritania.
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problem in their lament that
“Data from Africa are typically incomplete, error ridden
and inconsistent across authorities […] The results present-
ed here use data from several different international
sources, and the numbers are sometimes contradictory or
otherwise suspect. In consequence, the results should be
treated with even more than the usual degree of caution”
(Deaton and Miller, 1995, p. 36).
Regrettably, such findings are usually re-reported with less
caution than might be warranted. Worse still, particularly in thecase of economic governance, caution might not be exercised at
all as decision-makers (be it high-level government officials,
technocrats or entrepreneurs) use the data to inform future
decisions, plans, and negotiations.
This review shows that, while some improvements are being
made with regards to reporting procedures, inaccuracies in
trade statistics still exist. While liberalization in trading regimes
might have reduced the potential for errors of commission, the
lack of statistical capacity to cover African borders suggests
that errors of omission will remain a problem. Insofar as these
statistics are relied upon for their accuracy, decreasing this
prevalence should be prioritized by the offices that produce
them.Appendix 1. Data quality assessment frameworkElement 0
Prerequisites
of quality0.1 Legal and institutional
environment0.1.1 The responsibility for collecting, processing, and disseminating the statistics is clearly specified.
0.1.2 Data sharing and coordination among data-producing agencies are adequate.
0.1.3 Individual reporters' data are to be kept confidential and used for statistical purposes only.
0.1.4 Statistical reporting is ensured through legal mandate and/or measures to encourage response.0.2 Resources 0.2.1 Staff, facilities, computing resources, and financing are commensurate with statistical programs.
0.2.2 Measures to ensure efficient use of resources are implemented.0.3 Relevance 0.3.1 The relevance and practical utility of existing statistics in meeting users' needs are monitored.
0.4 Other quality
management0.4.1 Processes are in place to focus on quality.
0.4.2 Processes are in place to monitor the quality of the statistical program.
0.4.3 Processes are in place to deal with quality considerations in planning the statistical program.Element 1
Assurances
of integrity1.1 Professionalism 1.1.1 Statistics are produced on an impartial basis.
1.1.2 Choices of sources and statistical techniques as well as decisions about dissemination are
informed solely by statistical considerations.
1.1.3 The appropriate statistical entity is entitled to comment on erroneous interpretation and misuse
of statistics.1.2 Transparency 1.2.1 The terms and conditions under which statistics are collected, processed, and disseminated are
available to the public.
1.2.2 Internal governmental access to statistics prior to their release is publicly identified.
1.2.3 Products of statistical agencies/units are clearly identified as such.
1.2.4 Advance notice is given of major changes in methodology, source data, and statistical
techniques.1.3 Ethical standards 1.3.1 Guidelines for staff behavior are in place and are well known to the staff.
Element 2
Methodological
soundness2.1 Concepts and
definitions2.1.1 The overall structure in terms of concepts and definitions follows internationally accepted
standards, guidelines, or good practices.2.2 Scope 2.2.1 The scope is broadly consistent with internationally accepted standards, guidelines, or good
practices.2.3 Classification/
sectorization2.3.1 Classification/sectorization systems used are broadly consistent with internationally accepted
standards, guidelines, or good practices.2.4 Basis for recording 2.4.1 Market prices are used to value flows and stocks.
2.4.2 Recording is done on an accrual basis.
2.4.3 Grossing/netting procedures are broadly consistent with internationally accepted standards,
guidelines, or good practices.Element 3
Accuracy and reliability3.1 Source data 3.1.1 Source data are obtained from comprehensive data collection programs that take into account
country-specific conditions.
3.1.2 Source data reasonably approximate the definitions, scope, classifications, valuation, and time
of recording required.
3.1.3 Source data are timely.3.2 Assessment of
source data3.2.1 Source data—including censuses, sample surveys, and administrative records—are routinely
assessed, e.g., for coverage, sample error, response error, and nonsampling error; the results of the
assessments are monitored and made available to guide statistical processes.3.3 Statistical techniques 3.3.1 Data compilation employs sound statistical techniques to deal with data sources.
3.3.2 Other statistical procedures (e.g., data adjustments and transformations, and statistical analysis)
employ sound statistical techniques.(continued on next page)
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validation of intermediate
data and statistical outputs3.4.1 Intermediate results are validated against other information where applicable.
3.4.2 Statistical discrepancies in intermediate data are assessed and investigated.
3.4.3 Statistical discrepancies and other potential indicators or problems in statistical outputs are
investigated.3.5 Revision studies 3.5.1 Studies and analyses of revisions are carried out routinely and used internally to inform
statistical processes (see also 4.3.3).Element 4
Serviceability4.1 Periodicity and
timeliness4.1.1 Periodicity follows dissemination standards.
4.1.2 Timeliness follows dissemination standards.4.2 Consistency 4.2.1 Statistics are consistent within the dataset.
4.2.2 Statistics are consistent or reconcilable over a reasonable period of time.
4.2.3 Statistics are consistent or reconcilable with those obtained through other data sources and/or
statistical frameworks.4.3 Revision policy
and practice4.3.1 Revisions follow a regular and transparent schedule.
4.3.2 Preliminary and/or revised data are clearly identified.
4.3.3 Studies and analyses of revisions are made public (see also 3.5.1).Element 5
Accessibility5.1 Data accessibility 5.1.1 Statistics are presented in a way that facilitates proper interpretation and meaningful
comparisons (layout and clarity of text, tables, and charts).
5.1.2 Dissemination media and format are adequate.
5.1.3 Statistics are released on a preannounced schedule.
5.1.4 Statistics are made available to all users at the same time.
5.1.5 Statistics not routinely disseminated are made available upon request.5.2 Metadata accessibility 5.2.1 Documentation on concepts, scope, classifications, basis of recording, data sources, and
statistical techniques is available, and differences from internationally accepted standards, guidelines,
or good practices are annotated.
5.2.2 Levels of detail are adapted to the needs of the intended audience.5.3 Assistance to users 5.3.1 Contact points for each subject field are publicized.
5.3.2 Catalogs of publications, documents, and other services, including information on any changes,
are widely available.References
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